Pancho Villa and the Medellin Drug Cartel: Use of the Army against non-governmental entities. by Eschenbacher, Steven Norman.
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1990 
Pancho Villa and the Medellin Drug Cartel: Use of the Army 
against non-governmental entities. 
Steven Norman. Eschenbacher 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Eschenbacher, Steven Norman., "Pancho Villa and the Medellin Drug Cartel: Use of the Army against non-
governmental entities." (1990). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 9219. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/9219 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike 
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
Copying allowed as provided under provisions 
of the Fair Use Section of the U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, 1976.
Any copying for commercial purposes 
or financM gain may be under^en only 
with the author’s written consent.
University ofMontana
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PANCHO VILLA AND THE MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL:
USE OF THE ARMY AGAINST NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES
by
Steven Norman Eschenbacher 
B.A. Eastern Washington University, 1979
Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of 
Masters of Public Administration 
University of Montana 
1990
Approved by
Chairman, Board of 
Examiners
)ean, Graduate 
School
iXk-(u>- /^j /f ̂ àDate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: EP40021
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS  
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
OUtssrtation WWiaNng
UMI EP40021
Published by ProQuest LLC (2013). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition ©  ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 -1 3 4 6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..........................................i
CHAPTER
1. P U R P O S E .................................................1
2. THE MEDELLIN DRUG C A R T E L ........................... 10
3. PANCHO VILLA AND THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION . . .  23
4. A N A L Y S I S ............................................. 35
A N N E X ........................................................... 46
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY..............  48
11
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1 
PURPOSE
Drugs, particularly cocaine, have become a very
prevalent and dangerous threat to our nation's security.
There have been many who have sought to deal with the
problems of drug addiction and its associated problem of
urban crime. The results, however, have been only
disappointment. Many responsible members of the public have
demanded that the military be used to curb this threat to
our national security. The Defense Department has not
readily accepted this mission because of the perceived
ambiguities of any role that it may come to be assigned.
Appearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Major General Stephen G . Olmstead, USMC, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Enforcement, and
Director, Department of Defense Task Force on Drug
Enforcement, provided the following response during
questioning by Rep. Lawrence J. Smith of Florida:
Mr. Smith. But do we have any idea now of what support 
you plan to provide in fiscal 1987-1988 to anti-drug 
efforts in Latin America?
General Olmstead. In Latin America Specifically?
Mr. Smith. Yes. *
General Olmstead. No, sir, we do not have a program 
for that. I think—
Mr. Smith. You are on an as-need basis?
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General Olmstead. We are reactive. We are proactive 
reactors [emphasis added] to what people like Mr. 
Westrate and the other fine law enforcement agencies 
ask of us.
But specifically in response to your question, we 
do not have a DOD program down there.^
Since this exchange took place, there is still no clear
guidance from DoD concerning what role it will play in Latin
American drug interdiction. In fact, there are some
indications that the military is unwilling to participate in
drug interdiction programs.^
The popular perception is that the United States is in
a "drug war." Drug Czar William Bennett, and his umbrella
organization of the federal government's anti-drug forces,
display the apparent urgency of a military organization
during a crisis in order to fulfill President Bush's pledge
to eliminate the drug scourge from U.S. cities. Like most
wars, however, the initial rhetoric of the national
leadership has had to be tempered by reality. The
administration is forced to search for a way to reconcile
the differences between what is practical and what has been
promised to the electorate.
On the question about the use of the U.S. military, and
the Army in particular, in this "war," the White House has
issued contradictory statements. On the one hand, the
Administration said that American troops would be committed
to Colombia if President Virgilio Barco Vargas asks for
help^ but during the same week, the Administration
contradicted itself by saying that American troops would not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be used in any case.* This confusion and uncertainty on the 
part of the national leadership exacerbates the problem for 
U.S. allies.
Congress also has called for an increased military role 
in the war on drugs by using some of the trillion dollar 
plus arsenal that has been provided to the Pentagon over the 
last ten years. This call for action by the military is 
made in spite of the fact that a majority of the expensive 
weapons systems bought during that period were for nuclear 
forces or the Strategic Defense Initiative.®
In a Newsweek poll, the American public is reported to 
be in favor of a role for the U.S. military in the fight 
against drugs. Results show 53 per cent favoring the use of 
troops to only 34 per cent against, although 50 per cent 
feel that the only real and lasting solution to the drug 
problem will have to come on the cities' streets.® A call 
for action by the majority of the surveyed population for 
use of the military in the drug war has not gone unnoticed 
by politicians outside of Washington, with mayors and 
governors alike asking for help.’
The reality is that the U.S. Army already has been 
involved with the nations of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia in 
the fight against drugs for the last several years. With 
President Bush's promise of $65 million in aid to those 
countries participating in the Andean Initiative, the U.S. 
Army has sent seven teams of Special Forces trainers. This
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aid is in addition to those advisors already in place, with 
the total numbers of this additional assistance between 70 
and 100 U.S. soldiers.® These advisors have been primarily 
used to train the local police forces in counter-subversion 
tactics and small unit operations in order to combat the 
narcotraffickers operating in their respective 
jurisdictions. There have also been rumors that the 
Administration is seeking authority to use Special Forces to 
capture selected drug lords in order to bring them to 
justice in the U.S.®
Considering this lack of a clear definition of goals, 
it is obvious that it is now the time to think about the 
role the U.S. Army should be expected to perform in this 
national crusade. In order to be effective, the Army must 
be given a clear and unambiguous mission statement that is 
within its capabilities and has a definite beginning and 
ending point that can be achieved. The formation of this 
mission statement must carefully analyze the potential 
problems and identify the exact objective. It is this 
development that is necessary in order to create a mission 
statement for the Secretary of the Army to present to the 
Secretary of Defense for consideration by the President.
Since the philosopher Santyana stated that those who do 
not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it, the 
mission statement as developed in this paper will include an 
historical analysis of a like mission —  that of the
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Punitive Expedition against Pancho Villa, 1916-1917, under 
Brigadier General John J. (Blackjack) Pershing. In the case 
of the Punitive Expedition, the mission was the elimination 
of a non-governmental entity (Pancho Villa and his forces) 
in a foreign land where the local national authorities had 
no control. The possible commitment of U.S. ground troops 
in Colombia, would also be to eliminate a non-governmental 
entity (the Medellin Drug Cartel and its paramilitary 
security forces), which is also beyond the capabilities of 
the host national government to eradicate or control. These 
forces represented or are now a threat to both the United 
States and the host nation by either direct military action 
(Pancho Villa) or in the disruption of the social fabric of 
the two countries (the Medellin Drug Cartel).
The purpose of this mission statement will not be to 
eliminate the use of, or addiction to, the drug cocaine, 
since that task is beyond the scope of the Army. However, 
it is possible that the Army may have a legitimate role 
beyond that of advisors and trainers. Drug interdiction is 
the most logical role to be investigated.
Although the Army does not have the capability to stop 
ships on the high seas like the Navy, or the observation and 
interception of drug smuggling aircraft like the Air Force, 
it is the force best suited for operations in the northern 
portion of the South American continent. Some may argue 
that the Marines also have the capability to project force
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onto land. They do not, however, have a dedicated support 
structure independent of the Navy. The Army has its own 
Military Intelligence and other organizations which can be 
committed to the counter-drug force on the ground, instead 
of being siphoned away to identify ships carrying cocaine or 
other concerns, which detract from the mission of destroying 
cocaine production facilities.
Through examination of the process by which the coca 
plant is transformed into cocaine, it may be possible to 
determine limited periods of time where the drug can be 
successfully interdicted before it is loaded onto the ships 
or planes for the journey north. By using these logistical 
requirements against the narcotraffickers, there is a good 
possibility of reducing the cocaine availability in the 
United States.
The goal of this professional paper is to identify 
problems in the use of military forces in external 
interdiction of drug processing, by using an historical 
precedent, and to examine the vulnerabilities of cocaine 
processing in order to create a valid mission statement for 
the U.S. Army in an expanded role against drug trafficking. 
Success would be measured by the reduction of the estimated 
cocaine production of each of the labs destroyed, with a 
goal of over 200 tons in annual capacity being destroyed. 
This reduction in drug production will also lead to reduced 
availability of the drug in the U.S.
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The organization of this paper is as follows: Chapter 1 
states the problem as the need for a definite mission 
statement for the Army before it is committed in any-on-the 
ground role in South America against the production of 
cocaine.
Chapter 2 examines the general methods and processes 
whereby coca becomes transformed into cocaine. The purpose 
of this examination is to determine if there are vulnerable 
chokepoints in the process that can be interdicted. Chapter 
2 also addresses some of the concerns of the nations of 
South America and explains why they have not taken full 
steps to eradicate coca production.
Chapter 3 uses the historical analysis system of 
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May's book Thinking in T i m e to 
examine significant similarities and dissimilarities between 
the Punitive Expedition of 1916 and the possible 
contemporary use of the U.S. Army in Colombia,
Neustadt and May have developed a systematic approach 
for analyzing policy by comparing it to events in the past. 
The system that they have set up begins by listing three 
separate lists for the situation, what is Known. Unknown, 
and Presumed. After these have been listed, an evaluator 
should look for historical comparisons, then list the 
T.ikenesses and Differences. After the situation is clearly 
identified, Neustadt and May suggest that the evaluator then 
determine what is the desired outcome. Next they recommend
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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that the evaluator examine the history for any lessons 
learned that were successful and examine their applicability 
to the situation. Also, the authors recommend examining 
failures, in order to avoid repetition. Although the use of 
history can only provide analogies and not blueprints for 
action, historical examples should not be ignored. Chapter 
4 is a discussion of potential danger points for the Army 
and the nation as well as potential vulnerabilities that 
might be exploited. This chapter also uses the methods of 
Neustadt and May to examine the applicability of the 
historical example of the Punitive Expedition. The Annex 
is a proposed mission statement for the use of the President 
should action be implemented.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE MEDELLIN DRUG CARTEL
Cocaine, like its other "sister" narcotics opium and 
cannabis, has been known to mankind for over 4,000 years.^ 
The use of opium far outstretched that of either cannabis or 
cocaine until recently. Opium use even led to the two Opium 
wars that the British fought with the Chinese in order to 
maintain their treaty rights for supplying the needed Opium. 
It was not until cocaine became fashionable in the US and 
Europe that the production of the coca leaf expanded beyond 
that needed by the local Andean natives for chewing.^
In 1912 the nations of the world got together and signed the 
Hague Opium Convention of 1912. This convention led the 
international community to begin taking serious steps to 
control the production and use of illegal narcotics. Yet 
these attempts are failing as is obvious by the rise in drug 
addiction and drug related crime statistics. The fact that 
cocaine comes from South America is widely known. Yet, 
outside of the immediate drug trade and their antagonists, 
very little else is known about this pervasive problem.
Sources estimate that 80% of the coca leaf production 
of the world comes from the Upper Haulaga Valley of 
Bolivia.  ̂ It is grown there by small acreage farmers as an
10
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essential cash crop. The leaves are harvested 3-4 times a 
year by primarily manual methods .̂  The leaves are then 
purchased by regional "buyers" who arrange for the 
transportation to the cocaine labs which are located near 
the border inside Colombia.®
Once the coca leaves arrive at the labs, they are 
processed by a variety of methods that vary from extremely 
simple to extremely complex methods.® Lately, it seems as 
though the labs are growing in size and complexity, 
replacing the outdated manual production labs.’
In the labs, the cocaine is processed using ether and 
kerosene. The domestic requirements for both chemicals so 
outstrip local production that they must be imported from 
abroad.® The initial product is a coca paste called Basuco, 
which is widely preferred in Colombia by the young as a 
smokable narcotic.® It is extremely addictive and is 
causing problems for the Colombians' own drug addiction 
efforts. The other major product is cocaine hydrochloride 
which is the cocaine powder so well known in the United 
States and Europe.
Approximately one per cent of the coca leaf is actually 
utilizable as cocaine hydrochloride.^® With nearly 200,000 
metric tons of coca leaf production a n n u a l l y , t h i s  means a 
potential of over 2,000 metric tons of cocaine available 
every year. How much cocaine is produced is unknown, since 
the Cartel is adverse to opening their books for public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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scrutiny. Interdiction efforts, however, are not matching
the production estimates. In testimony before the Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control of the House of
Representatives, Mr. David L. Westrate, Assistant
Administrator for Operations of the Drug Enforcement
Administration stated that in 1988,
1,800 metric tons of coca leaf were seized (figure 
includes eradication efforts), as well as several 
metric tons of essential chemicals for the production 
of coca paste and cocaine base. Additionally, almost 
17,000 gallons of liquid solution in process to produce 
coca paste were seized, as were almost 2 metric tons of 
completely processed coca paste...And, cocaine products 
seizures amounted to 8.2 metric tons
Using Mr. Westrate's figures in comparison to those of 
the potential production, even if cut in half, clearly show 
that we are not winning the battle against cocaine. 
Interdiction, however, is not the only method of preventing 
drug imports. Eradication is also being pursued with 
limited results.
Coca eradication efforts on the part of Bolivia and 
Peru, in spite of the efforts of the Andean Initiative, have 
failed for a variety of reasons. Primarily, both of these 
countries are extremely poor with no other agricultural 
product offering the financial incentive of coca.“ There is 
also the traditional usage of the coca leaves by the Andean 
natives as a medicant for dealing with pain and the 
difficult life in the high Andes, which prohibits the total 
eradication of the crop, even though the total production
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far exceeds the needs of the natives.^*
Since the farmers are unable to receive adequate 
subsistence from other crops, there is a great deal of 
pressure on the governments to allow the continued 
production of the coca crop. The governments cannot act
effectively to eradicate the production of coca because 
their basis in power as a democratically elected institution 
is tentative at best. There are almost always rumors of a 
military coup whenever stronger initiatives are suggested.^* 
Colombia, with an older and more established democratic 
tradition, faces a different set of problems when it comes 
to cocaine.” The legal authorities are unable to respond 
effectively to the threat posed to its democratic 
institutions from a more powerful internal force, the 
Medellin and its lesser known and equally powerful 
consortium, Cali cartel.^®
The Medellin cartel is a force which is beyond the 
power of the Colombian government to control. They are 
essentially not answerable to either the legal or political 
systems within the country. The cartels' power is due 
primarily to their unhesitating use of bribery and murder in 
order to accomplish their ends.”
It is not unusual for a Colombian judge scheduled to 
hear the case of a drug trafficker to receive a message that 
they either accept the Cartel's silver, or their lead.^° The 
Cartel possesses tremendous resources, to the extent that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Carlos Lehder*^ once offered to pay off the national debt if 
the Colombian government gave up any attempts to extradite 
narcotrafficantes to the U.S., where they would not be as 
able to bribe or intimidate the justice system.
Additionally, the Cartel has a huge impact on the economic 
situation of the country. While actual employment figures 
of the Cartel are not known, it is estimated that "hundreds 
of thousands of people are employed by the industry.
There is also a significant national sentiment in favor 
of the Cartel, in spite of the damage that is wreaked on 
Colombia. This sentiment stems from two major sources.
First is the perception that cocaine is only a problem for 
the "Gringos" who are unable to deal with the problem in 
their own country and have to take it out on the poorer 
nations of the hemisphere. Second, there is the perception 
that the Cartel is the only group capable of dealing with 
the communist guerrillas .
Cocaine is of course a significant problem in the U.S., 
but it is growing as a problem for the Colombians 
themselves. First, as already mentioned, is the growing use 
of Basuco, a form of coca paste that is smoked. This highly 
addictive drug is resulting in greater levels of crime by 
the users in order to obtain money with which to purchase 
it. There is also a concomitant increase in idle labor as 
more and more of Colombia's young seek diversion from 
reality through the use of the drug.“
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The Colombians are also aware of the terror that the 
Cartel uses in order to get their way. The Cartel has 
routinely murdered newspaper editors, justice ministers, 
police chiefs and even presidential candidates who speak out 
against them.^® They organized the assault on the Colombian 
Supreme court, which resulted in the deaths of several of 
the justices considering an extradition treaty.^’ The Cartel 
does not operate subtly since their reputation is going to 
be enhanced by any known murders, while at the same time, 
they do not fear prosecution.*®
The second factor that leads the average Colombian to 
not actively oppose the Cartel, is the perception that thëf 
Cartel can deal most effectively with the Sendero Luminoso, 
F.À.R.C. (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and other 
guerilla groups. Outside of localized regions, the 
guerrillas do not enjoy the sympathy of the populace.*®
The guerrillas and the Cartel were first thought to be 
working in concert. This was even reported by the U.S.
ambassador to C o l o m b i a . R e c e n t  events would seem to
suggest otherwise. The guerrillas have always occupied the 
more rural areas of Colombia, where their greatest popular
support originates. When the Cartel began looking for areas
in which to set up their cocaine processing labs, they 
selected the same areas in which the guerrillas were based. 
Initially the two operated side by side ignoring each other. 
However, the guerrillas soon realized that they could
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extract a form of "protection" for a price which was 
designed to protect the labs from government intrusion. The 
guerrillas also began to look to cocaine as a means with 
which to supplement contributions from abroad for the 
purchase of weapons.
When the Cartel began to grow stronger in the region, 
they resisted paying for the "protection" and carried on a 
limited war against the guerrillas which was played up in 
the Colombian press to the Cartel's advantage.”
The government enjoys more support for the prosecution 
of the war against the guerrillas than it does against the 
Cartel. This is perhaps best typified by the example of the 
arrest of Carlos Lehder, a major Cartel leader. The police 
Major who found out where Lehder was staying had to tell his 
forces that they were going to raid a suspected guerrilla 
hideout rather than to arrest a drug trafficker. In his 
opinion, the police would more readily attack a guerrilla 
outpost than they would drug traffickers out of fear for 
their families and themselves.” To emphasize the point, 
when Lehder was captured, he offered to have his picture 
taken with his captors, who did so, only after masking their 
identities.®*
It is readily apparent that the Cartel is operating a 
system which will only end in the destruction of the 
democratic processes both in the United States and Colombia. 
Their use of force, terror and corruption will have to be
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met with a greater call for police and paramilitary 
measures. It is also obvious that the Colombian nation does 
not have the power to control the Cartel.
The Colombians will require assistance in order to 
prevail over this very potent force. Regional cooperation 
will be limited at best, since Colombia, the nation hardest 
hit, is also one of the strongest political and economic 
entities in northern South America. One can also assume 
that the Colombians will not readily agree to intrusion by 
the U.S. unless there is a guarantee of success that the 
Cartel's power will be broken.
There is also the possibility that any unilateral use 
of force on the part of the U.S. could backfire, and unite 
the Colombian nation as well as the other members of the 
hemisphere against us. The preferred method of using the 
U.S. military in the region would be in concert with the 
national and military forces in the region. Unfortunately, 
due to the Cartel's power, corruption exists up to the 
highest levels within the government, which could compromise 
any U.S. actions.
This is not to say that all Colombians are corrupt.
Far from it in fact, since many brave Colombian police, 
judges and soldiers have lost their lives fighting this 
powerful entity. Rather, cooperation with the Colombians 
would have to be only in the cases of the most trusted 
members of the government, police and military. Even then.
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to work with them more than once could lead to their 
compromise, or possible retribution by the Cartel.
Therefore, any action on our part would have to be pursued 
with an eye on the clock while trying to inflict maximum 
damage on the Cartel in the least amount of time.
If an operation is allowed to drag on too long, we risk 
vulnerability to the Cartel's dollars even among our own 
soldiers, as the U.S. Coast Guard is finding out right now.*® 
Therefore, an arbitrary, but necessary maximum time limit of 
no more than ten days should be established for any 
operations actually in Colombia. The military must also 
take every step possible to minimize any contact with the 
native populace. Opportunities for bribes, graft and 
corruption must be combatted at the same time in our own 
forces.
One possible staging area for any operations in 
Colombia could be the Canal Zone of Panama. Until 1999, the 
Zone is still under U.S. control. The Zone is also the home 
of USSOUTHCOM, which is responsible for all military actions 
in the region. The use of the Canal Zone for a staging base 
would improve the level of security needed for any such 
operation while maintaining close proximity to the target 
areas, which can be reached by aerial refueling of 
helicopters. One liability of using Panama may be the 
sensitivities of the Panamanians that a military force used 
their country for aggression against another. Active
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measures must be taken by the Ambassador to Panama to 
explain what the purpose is and to enlist support for any 
such operations. Failure to do so successfully could 
jeopardize future operations in the region and be extremely 
damaging to U.S. interests.
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CHAPTER 3
PANCHO VILLA AND THE PUNITIVE EXPEDITION
On the morning of March 9th, 1916, Pancho Villa 
attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico. This raid 
resulted in the deaths of three soldiers and four civilians, 
with several soldiers and civilians wounded. Property 
damage was limited to the depot and several other principal 
buildings in Columbus that were burned or destroyed.
This property damage was not, however, the total extent 
of the results, since the largest and most important was the 
outrage that the raid caused among the citizens of the 
United States. Some people believe that this arousal of the 
American public was exactly what Pancho Villa was trying to 
achieve, since the introduction of U.S. forces into Mexico 
could have been expected to stir up nationalistic sentiments 
and quite possibly result in the overthrow of the de facto 
Carranza government.^
News of the raid reached Washington by telegraph from 
the Customs officer of El Paso, who reported:
Following from Deputy Collector, Columbus, New Mexico 
[Riggs]: "Columbus attacked this morning 4:30 o^clock. 
Citizens murdered. Repulsed about 6 o'clock. Town 
partly burned. They have retreated to west. Unable to 
say how many were killed." Department of Justice 
informed that between 400 and 500 Villa troops attacked
23
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Columbus, New Mexico about 4:30. Villa probably in 
charge. Three American soldiers killed and several 
wounded; also killed four civilians and wounded four. 
Several of attacking party killed and wounded by our 
forces. Attacking party also burned depot and other 
buildings in Columbus. United States soldiers now 
pursuing attacking parties across line into Mexico.^
At the same time, thanks to a reporter being present on the 
scene, the public was informed almost immediately. For the 
first time the American people were observing the effects of 
war as it happened, from the safety of their own homes.
The first question asked by the media, was what the 
government intended to do to punish this outrage. 
Unfortunately, there was no one who knew just what the clear 
answer was going to be. There were many competing factions 
who were attempting to gain this issue for their own 
advantage. Teddy Roosevelt led the charge of the 
interventionists, joined by those Americans who were looking 
for a reason to annex Mexico in order to exploit its natural 
resources.
Opposing the former president and his minions was the 
sitting president, Woodrow Wilson. Wilson was known for his 
humanitarian feelings in general and his feelings toward 
Mexico in particular. Since the revolution in Mexico began, 
Wilson had attempted every legitimate political and 
diplomatic practice to ensure the viability of the Carranza 
government at the expense of Generals Huerta and Villa, whom 
Wilson considered to be immoral and not fit to lead Mexico.
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Unfortunately for Wilson, this support of Carranza did not 
result in agreement or acceptance of Wilson's proposals by 
Carranza, since there was always a strong sense of 
nationalism in Mexico that thrived on rejecting anything 
from the "Colossus to the North."
Although Wilson, if left to his own devices, might have 
wanted to pursue a particularly diplomatic course and leave 
out the option of military force, there were several 
features that would have made this impossible. First, 
Carranza's government did not have the power to bring Pancho 
Villa to justice, since they had been trying for some time 
to do just that. Ever since the break in relations between 
Carranza and Villa, Villa had been undertaking counter­
revolutionary activities in order to establish his primacy 
in any government in Mexico. Second, the rest of the world 
was watching to see what the United States would do with 
regard to this violation of its sovereignty. Failure to act 
may have encouraged the Germans, who were at that moment 
fighting the battle of Verdun, while disheartening the 
Allies from expecting support from the U.S. A third aspect 
would have been that failure to act could only encourage 
future raids by Villa and other border criminals who could 
feel that there was no risk to any cross-border 
penetrations.
The biggest reason for the need of some form of action 
was the arousal of American public opinion during an
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election year. Not even a confirmed pacifist could be 
expected to disregard this assault with impunity. Having 
recognized that inaction was not an option, Wilson had to 
face the possibility of a full scale invasion of Mexico and 
the re-arrangement of Mexico's affairs. Unfortunately, this 
option would have required 270,000 men and from 1 to 5 years 
to accomplish.^ The President immediately discarded this 
option, based in part on his religious and moral convictions 
against war and imperialism.
It was this very lack of options that created the need 
for the Punitive Expedition, which was only to be concerned 
with the subject of Pancho Villa and his band. There was 
sufficient historical precedent to justify the expedition, 
particularly concerning the pursuit of marauding Indians. 
There were two characteristics that typified this type of 
action: (1) the force crossing into another country's
territory did so for a specific and limited purpose such as 
the apprehension of a single band of Indians, and (2) the 
crossing was made on a "hot trail" where pursuit followed 
directly on the heels of the pursued.*
The issue of a limited purpose could be satisfied by 
the mission of apprehending Villa or the elimination of his 
gang. The problem, of course, was the issue of the "hot 
trail." There had never been an established amount of time 
before a trail could grow "cold." The Wilson administration 
took steps to rectify this problem by declaring.
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An adequate force will be sent at once in the pursuit 
of Villa with the single object of capturing him and 
putting a stop to his forays. This can and will be 
done in entirely friendly aid to the constituted 
authorities in Mexico and with scrupulous respect for 
the sovereignty of that Republic.®
The issue of respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of
Mexico was confused by the desires of the Carranza
government to prevent the U.S. from entering Mexico.
Through Carranza's government's introduction of a proposal
that would have limited action by the U.S., they hoped to
prevent any immediate action until a public support base
could be developed domestically.® The U.S. administration
interpreted the proposal from the Carranza government as a
positive step that would allow them to pursue Villa. The
Carranza government, on the other hand, felt that it was
only making a proposal for future operations, and that this
had nothing to do with the present crisis. This opinion was
brought home to Wilson's administration with the note from
Mr. Arredondo to Secretary Lansing, in which Mr. Arredondo
expressed extreme surprise at the American actions taking
place in northern Mexico
Notwithstanding the obvious lack of understanding
between the two nations, the Adjutant General of the U.S.
Army sent a telegram to General Funston, who was the
commander of the military department that included Texas and
New Mexico. The telegram said :
President has directed that an armed force be sent into 
Mexico with the sole object of capturing Villa and 
preventing any further raids by his band, and with
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scrupulous regard to sovereignty of Mexico. Secretary 
War directs you telegraph exactly what you need in 
order to carry out foregoing general instructions, but 
you will not take any overt steps until receipt 
definite orders from War Department.®
On March 11, 1916, General Funston received detailed orders
from the War Department stating in part:
You will promptly organize an adequate military force 
of troops from your department under the command of 
Brigadier General Pershing. You will direct him to 
proceed promptly across the border in pursuit of the 
Mexican band which attacked the town of Columbus N.M. 
and the troops there on the morning of the Ninth 
instant. The troops will be withdrawn as soon as the 
de facto government of Mexico is able to relieve them 
of this work. In any event. the work of these troops 
will be regarded as finished as soon as Villa's band or 
bands are known to be broken u p . (Italics added).*
General Funston received a follow up telegram on March 13,
1916 from the War Department with the following
instructions :
The [P]resident desires that your attention be 
especially and earnestly called to his determination 
that the expedition into Mexico is limited to the 
purposes originally stated, namely the pursuit and 
dispersion of the band or bands that attacked Columbus, 
N. M . , and it is of the utmost importance that no color 
of any other possibility or intention be given and 
therefore, while the President desires the force to be 
adequate to disperse the bands in question and to 
protect communications, neither in size nor otherwise 
should the expedition afford the slightest ground of 
suspicion of any other larger object.^®
Thus, General Pershing had the mission either to (1) capture
Pancho Villa and break up his band or bands, or, (2) to
break up his bands. Unfortunately, the tactically feasible
mission to break up Villa's bands did not fit with the
original White House announcement that the object of the
Punitive Expedition was to capture Pancho Villa. Since
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waging war on only one man is very difficult for any army, 
it is quite likely, although unproven, that General Pershing 
saw his mission only as the elimination of Villa's bands, 
which was obtainable.
The problem that the Expedition first ran into was not 
so much Villa's bands, but the miscommunication between 
Washington and Mexico over what Pershing was doing. The 
Wilson administration believed that Mexico realized domestic 
politics required some form of a c t i o n , w h i l e  Mexico felt 
that the Wilson administration would stand by its announced 
policies of non-intervention.^^ Perhaps the only reason that 
the entire incident did not erupt into full scale war was 
because neither country could afford to have one. This, 
however, is not to say that there were not incidents during 
the Expedition.
On the 12th of April, 1916, a force under Major 
Tompkins, consisting of Troops M and K of the 13th Cavalry 
entered Parral, a town in North-Central Mexico, under the 
invitation of General Lozano, the de facto government forces 
commander of the region. After having lunch in the town. 
Major Tompkins and his troops were leaving when they came 
under attack by the local citizenry and soldiers of the de 
facto military. No attempt was made by General Lozano to 
halt the attack, which resulted in 3 soldiers dead and six 
wounded for the U.S. and over 40 killed on the Mexican 
side.^^ After investigation, it was felt that this was a
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poorly organized trap, designed without the knowledge of the 
commanding general to lure U.S. forces into an ambush.“
The effect the battle ultimately showed in the attitude of 
the local natives to the Punitive Expedition by their overt 
hostility in there and other regions as well
This was further aggravated by a second incident at 
Carrizal, Mexico. On the 21st of June 1917, two cavalry 
troops under the command of Captain Boyd attempted to enter 
Carrizal. They were met on the outskirts of the town by 
General Gomez of the de facto military forces, who tried to 
convince Boyd that he could not enter the town. For some 
unknown reason (since Boyd died in the engagement), Boyd 
persisted in entering the town, even though badly 
outnumbered and in a tactically impossible position.“ After 
the battle, 40 American soldiers were dead and 17 captured. 
This action seems to have been a unilateral decision made by 
Captain Boyd since he was not given any orders to enter the 
town.
After this incident, for the next eight months, until 
the removal of the Expedition's forces, the U.S. Army was 
limited to local security patrolling.^® No significant 
activities were reported.
In hindsight, it is obvious that Pershing did 
accomplish his mission, which was to break up Pancho Villa's 
bands in order to prevent their return and marauding. This 
may not have been the popular perception since Pancho Villa
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himself was not captured. However, within the limits of 
what was tactically feasible, the only real mistake may have 
been the announcement of unattainable goals by the White 
House.
Ironically this mistake was repeated during Operation 
"Just Cause," the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989. 
Of the four elements for undertaking the invasion listed, it 
was the least significant (capture of General Manuel 
Noriega) that received the greatest attention.
The significant events of the Punitive Expedition that 
have application in a present day context can be narrowed to 
four:
a. The misunderstanding between the governments in 
Washington and Mexico prevented effective coordination or 
cooperation, partially resulting in the Parral Incident.
This misunderstanding is complicated by the suspicious view 
which Latin American countries have of the motives and 
measures taken by the U.S. This view still exists in Latin 
America
b. Extended service by U.S. forces will only cause the 
population to resent the intrusion by "imperialistic Yankee 
forces." Any operation that places U.S. forces in contact 
with the local nationals should be quickly finished.
c. Independent operations like those of Captain Boyd's 
must be held to a minimum. Tight command and control must 
be exercised at all times over field operations. Any
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operation will require the highest degree of discipline and 
adherence to orders.
d. Last, and most important, official proclamations of 
the desired results must be the same as those given to the 
military commander to accomplish. These objectives must 
have the appropriate emphasis clearly defined for the public 
consumption. Otherwise, the administration runs the risk of 
having the success of the mission determined by outside 
agencies with potentially negative results.
These factors must be taken into account before the 
U.S. introduces forces into Latin America. The preferred 
arrangement, would be to conduct operations in conjunction 
with the legitimate governments of the region. This would 
take care of the first two concerns listed above.
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